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Summary  findings
Among the lessons financial history offers:  *  The difficulty of supervising universal banks and
Macroeconomic stability - low inflation and sound  financial conglomerates is an argument used against them
public finance  -is  important tor creating the right  in developing countries. But universal banks may
incentives for banks and for facilitating the development  generate efficiency gains as they overcome the problems
of securities markets. High inflation and large fiscal  of inadequate reliable public information on industrial
deficits distort economic behavior in favor of short-term  and commercial companies. Holding small equity stakes
specularive projects and discourage the long-ternm  and being involved in corporate governance mav be
investment projects conducive to sustainable economic  productive. The risk of overlending to related firms is
developmeit.  Central banik independence may conrribute  likelv to be small when banks hold small stakes in
to economic stabilitv. One way to increase it is by  industrial firms; it is high when firms control  banks.
lengtheninig the term of central bank governors.  *  Pension funds aiid other institutional investors have
There  mutr be incentives for bank owners to behave  grown in importance in many counltries over the past
prudently - a requirement that they have capital  thirty years or so, because of longer life spans and longer
commensurate with the risks they assume, for example.  retirement. T hese funds started as labor market
Unlimited liability and double liability limits may be less  institutions and personnel management tools, but have
feasible now than in the past, but banks in developing  become important financial intermediaries. Pension
countries that face higher risks should maintain higher  funds offer developing countries an alternative both for
capital ratios than banks in the more advanced OECD  restructuring their public finances and for promoting
countries. Effective supervision is also essential.  their capital markets.
Banks run into solvency problems becatise they fail  Pension funds can play the role that thrift deposit
to diversify - ofteen  because of regulatory (especially  institutions - such as savings banks, credit cooperatives,
geographic) restrictions, but also because of excessive  and building societies --  played in developed countries
connected lending or genuine mistakes. Regulators must  in the nineteenth century.  But thrift institutions can still
ensure that banks diversify their risks, which means  contribute to financial and economnic  development by
ending geographic or sectoral restrictions (includin-ig  promotinig thrift and facilitating credit in rural areas and
prohibitions against holding foreign assets) and  among low-irncome  groups. They will contribute more if
restricting connectcd lending.  they involve a three tier structure that combines the
- Developing effective supervision (to enisure  benefits of local involvement and mnonitoring  with
meaningful anid effective compliance witlh  prudential  centralized auditing and supervision.
rules) is difficult and time-consuming but essential.
This paper - a joint product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Departnment,  and
the Financial Sector Development Department - was presented at a Bank seminar, "Financial History: Lessons  of the Past
for Reformers  of the Present,"  and  is a chapter  in a forthcoming  volume,  Reformning Fittance: Somne Lesso,ts frontz History,
edited by Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Dimitri Vittas. Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank. 1818 H Srreet
NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Daniele Evans, room N9-061, telephone 202-473-8526,  fax 202-522-1955,
Internet address pinfo(aworldbank.org.  November  1995. (26 pages)
The Policy Research  Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of  work in progress to  encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series is to get the findings ou2t  qu2ickly,  even if the presentationis  are less  than fully polished. The
papers  carry  the namnes  of the autthors  and should  be  used  and cited  accordingly.  The  findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  are  the
authors' oun  and should not be attributed to the World Bank, its Executive Board of Directors, or any of its m2emr2ber  countries.
Pr-oduced bv  thc  lPolicy Research  1)issemination  CenterFinancial History: Lessons  of the Past




This  paper  was presented  at a World  Bank  Seminar,  'Financial History:  Lessons  of the Past  for
Reformers  of the Present,"  and  is a chapter  in a forthcoming  volume,  Reforming  Finance:  Some
Lessons  from History,  edited  by Gerard  Caprio,  Jr. and  Dimitri  Vittas. The author  wishes  to thank
the  participants  at that  seminar  and  the editors  for their  comments.Table of Contents
1. On the Role  of Central  and Commercial  Banks
11.  Savings  and Nonbank  Finance
Ill. Concluding  Remarks
BibliographyFinancial systems in many developing and transitional economies are in a state of flux, in
many instances emerging from periods of significant repression and more recent episodes
of financial reforms, with little to show for the changes. Indeed, financial crises or more
silent forms of financial distress appear to be widespread, from Argentina, Mexico and
Venezuela, to many countries in Eastern Europe and the forrner Soviet Union, to those in
Africa and parts of Asia.  For a variety of reasons, financial reforms are difficult to
manage, as they involve changing incentive systems and institutions.  Also, finance, in
particular banking, the heart of developing and transitional economies  financial systems,
is different from other sectors or industries, in that failures can spread in a contagious
fashion from one institution to another, with deleterious effects on the rest of the
economy.  And, in part as an effort to cope with contagion, some or all liabilities offered
by banks often carry an implicit or explicit government guarantee, creating a moral
hazard problem.
In addition, a major difficulty with attempts to reform finance, whatever the initial
conditions, is that the reformers virtually always take as given the goal, namely to move
their financial systems towards the general model that has been adopted in most OECD
countries today.  This model, to the extent that one can generalize, is based on a safety
net, in the form of government "insurance" for deposits, a prescribed minimum capital
adequacy ratio, and government supplied supervision.  Not only do these latter financial
systems have unresolved problems of their own -- for examnple,  significant banking
problems in France, Japan, Scandinavia, and the United States -- but they require a rich
institutional environment that cannot be transplanted overnight, or even in a few years, if
Iat all.  In particular, the upgrading of supervisory systems to "world class" standards,
without which government guarantees are dangerous, appears to be difficult and time
consuming. It is also noteworthy that the prescribed capital ratios are low (8%) compared
with that found in OECD countries during their industrializing  period.  1
Fortunately, the present OECD country experience  is not the only one available to
emerging markets today; modern banking has been in existence since the fourteenth
century, and the late eighteenth century and especially the period of the nineteenth
century through the 1  920s are rich with experience  of financial systems without much
supervision or government safety net, both of which began during and following the
depression of the 193  Os. This period is also relevant to developing and transitional
countries today, as it is the era when OECD countries were moving from a reliance on
agriculture and various commodities to industrial development. Given the relevance of
these earlier periods, the conference from which this paper takes its title was organized to
investigate various aspects of the evolution of financial systems and to draw out lessons
for emerging economies today. This paper summarizes the key lessons, including the rise
of central banks, debates on how to make banking safe and sound, the relative efficiencv
of universal banking (compared with the Anglo-American  commercial  banking model),
and the role of savings banks, nonbanks, and securities markets in development. The
next section concentrates on the lessons  that have been deduced from a review of the rise
of central and commercial banking, while Section II looks at issues related to savings
banks and nonbank finance.
It should be noted that this paper does not present magic cures which, if taken,
alone suffice to ensure a dynamic and efficient financial system in which all deposits are
safe and all loans performing. If there had been such a successful model for finance, it
I For example, in the United States capital-asset ratios routinely ranged from 15% to 35% in the latter part
of the nineteenth century through the 1920s (Saunders and Wilson in this volume). According to Tilly
(1966) even higher ratios -- 25% to 50% -- were recorded for German banks in the period 1830 to 1900.
2would be clear from country experience  -- and although some observers had been quick
to claim such merits for the Japanese financial system in the 1980s,  the number and
vociferousness of their claims have plummeted with the growing estimates of losses in
that banking system. Careful examination of cross country and historical evidence can
instead only lead one to conclude that recommendations  for any country s financial
system need to be "tuned" to the institutions and culture of the country.
That caveat notwithstanding,  there are some lessons  to be drawn. Perhaps the two
most important factors that authorities  should keep foremost in their minds in reforming
their financial system are diversification and incentives. Regulators need constantly to
verify that banks can and do diversify their risks, and that bank owners face incentives
that will induce them to behave prudently. Although the latter is of prime importance,
there are different ways of accomplishing  this goal, which in turn provides the basis for
some of the differences observed over time in financial systems. Many of the lessons
provided below put some flesh on these quite general recommendations and elaborate
their consequences.
1.  On the Role of Central and Commercial Banks.
For several hundred years after the rise of banking during the Renaissance, banking
systems functioned without a central bank, and these systems experienced serious
inflationary and deflationary  shocks associated with reserve flows, among other factors.
Central banks emerged, as Forrest Capie explains in Chapter 2, to fulfill both the macro
function of inflation control as well as the micro role of ensuring banking system
stability. Early central banks originated as national banks that were induced to assume
more of a role as a lender of last resort, and it is this function which Capie notes was an
important factor leading to their divestiture of commercial  banking to avoid any conflict
of interest. Also, it might be noted, it is difficult  enough to excel at central banking
3functions, so one might suspect that central banks would perform better with fewer
distractions. 2 Interestingly,  transitional economies appeared to have relatively quickly
separated commercial  and central banking functions. However, the appearance of a move
to a two-tier banking system is somewhat deceptive in economies where the central bank
refinances a significant amount of credit by state owned banks, a phenomena that has
been occurring in some transitional economies.
Central bank independence is much discussed currently, and Capie notes that
early central banks in effect had a special source for their independence,  due to the
absence of the notion, which did not become popularized until the Depression and the
early post-World War II era, that fiscal policy could be used to influence macroeconomic
aggregates such as employment and output. Without this presumption, and with a gold
standard system, the few central banks in existence -- the Bank of England and a dozen
other institutions -- were able to maintain a high degree of independence. 3 Although
many economists have long since concluded that changes in budget deficits will not have
permanent real effects, the fact that politicians live in the short run, along with more
widespread  beliefs in the role of the state in providing an array of services and safety nets,
has led to more regular attempts to use fiscal policy to influence macroeconomic
aggregates. If authorities wish to increase the likelihood that the central bank will be able
to resist pressures to accomnmodate  future fiscal demands,  then measures such as
significantly lengthening the terms of central bank governors,  making it difficult to
remove them, etc., would all tend to give monetary policy officials the longer term view
that, in effect, formnerly  tended to induced by the gold standard. 4
2  Hammond (1956) describes how the Second Bank of the United States -- which, like the Bank of
England, was a private institution  -- coped with this conflict  of interest during the 1812-1932 period. As is
easily imaginable, it is difficult to construct an incentive  system for an institution  with both commercial
activities and central banking functions.
3 Of course, with a textbook gold standard, one might say that central bankers had little to do in terms of
worrying about the growth of monetary aggregates. However, the gold standard was not quite an
automatic text book system, as suggested by Triffin (1964).
4 Alcazar (1995) suggests that longer  terms are more effective than other methods at increasing central
bank independence.
4A second lesson on central banking that is of key importance to policy makers is
that reforms take time.  While it is fashionable to try to introduce market determined
interest rates and open market operations, Capie recounted in the discussion period that
the Bank of England took about 50 years to move from direct to indirect implementation
of monetary policy.  To be sure, as the first central bank, and the first one to make this
shift, it is understandable that changes proceeded slowly. However, although this
previous experience can help accelerate change in developing countries today,
organizations and institutions still take time to change and acquire needed skills, such as
the management of interest rate risk, and officials in particular need time to feel
comfortable without direct controls.  Since it is important that organizations competing in
markets for funds be solvent, assuring that the participants are and likely will remain
solvent will also take some time.  Thus moving from direct to indirect implementation of
monetary policy should be seen as a problem of financial development that will have to
stretch over many years -- say a decade -- rather than a short interval -- and the lower the
initial income level, the longer the expected time for this transition.
Whenever central banks are criticized for their performance, or seem incapable of
improving economic outcomes and possibly worsening them, inevitably there are calls to
do away with these institutions and instead adopt "free banking."  This term can have
many meanings.  In the narrow sense, free banking means both free entry into banking
and the ability of banks to issue their own paper, or notes.  So conceived, free banking
eliminates, or appears to deny, the need for a central bank, which is usually given a
monopoly power on note issue and the ability to serve as a "gatekeeper" regarding entry
into the system.  The Scottish example (in the 150 years up to the Peel Act of 1844)
comes the closest to satisfying the criteria for free banking, and it appears to be a
successful case.  Scotland during that period was a rapidly industrializing country,
starting from a low level and actually overtaking England. One of the fears of removing
5entry barriers in banking is that it might attract unsavory elements, or more kindly, those
who are willing to engage in excessive risk-taking. Kroszner makes clear in his
contribution to this volume that one important ingredient  in the Scottish case was the
unlimited liability of the owner of "free" banks. This feature likely led to high levels of
capital to protect the personal fortunes of bank owners. True, as with any regulatory
requirement, its spirit can be evaded by having a part owner who is hard to find, but if
laws are in place so that this is the duty of the other owners, and that the penalty for
evading the law is high, it likely would be effective in motivating owners to ensure that
their bank is prudently managed.
If unlimited liability is more effective in inducing safe and sound banking, then
one might expect to find lower losses and less evidence of contagion, and this is
suggested by Kroszner and by Saunders  and Wilson as well. Kroszner notes that the
Scottish experience was not entirely without a lender of last resort (LOLR), as there were
three large banks with limited liability, as well as the Bank of England (BOE) to call on
in times of crisis. So although it is possible to argue that unlimited liability reduced the
threat of bank contagion, the presence of these other institutions might also have been a
factor. The case for unlimited liability is strengthened,  however, by the fact that bank
runs were more prevalent among English banks at the time, which of course had the same
BOE on which they could depend as well. To be sure, adopting free banking is not an all-
or-none proposition: one could still have a central bank in charge of note issuance and yet
have higher liability limits and easy entry for bank owners to reap the incentive benefits.
Saunders and Wilson also reviewed  higher liability limits, in the form of the
double liability limits in some states in the U.S., a practice that came into existence at
least in part following  the experience,  beginning in 1837, of free banking with limited
liability (and the popular stories of "wildcat" banking). According  to the double liability
system, each owner was liable for a post-closure  assessment of an amount equal to their
6capital, which would have already been drawn on to cover losses. As Saunders and
Wilson indicate, this practice led to fewer involuntary closures and more voluntary
mergers, and appeared to have played an important role in insulating depositors against
loss. Thus some form of higher liability limits on bank owners appears to be worth
consideration in emerging markets as a way of increasing owners incentives to monitor
their managers. As noted by Caprio (1995)5, developing and transitional economies are
risky environments, not just due to policy changes but even more so due to their small
size. Hence, applying the same capital requirement  --  in the form of the Basle guidelines,
which were devised for relatively large and diversified economies -- to smaller and
undiversified countries could be dangerous. Raising liability limits induces the market to
set capital ratios, rather than officials, which may be convenient as it is difficult to know
how high capital ratios should be raised in different economies.
It is possible that raising liability limits too high might lead to a sub-optimal
supply of financial services. However, in neither the Scottish nor the U.S. case does this
appear to have been a problem: both economies were the "miracle" economies of their era
and as Kroszner illustrates, even with unlimited liability there was notable innovation by
the Scottish free banks, including a form of option contracts. 6 Thus this drawback does
not appear to be too severe, though it would be reassuring if there were more cases of
higher liability limits on which a conclusion could be based. But for officials beset by
financial instability and underdeveloped  supervisory capacity, higher liability limits
5 That paper  also  notes  other  methods  to improve  incentives  facing  bank  owners;  such  as arbitrarily  raising
capital  requirements,  limiting  entry  to build  up franchise  value,  free banking,  and  narrow  banking. It
should  be recognized  that  all of these  assume  private  owners.  Joint liability,  such  as through  participation
in a clearinghouse  association,  would  also  improve  private  incentives. For state-owned  banks,  there is no
clear  evidence  that  any  of these  options  would  have  an effect,  as they  assume  owners  motivated  by profits.
6 Interestingly,  these  option  clauses  represented  a market  solution  to bank runs,  in  that  they gave  the
issuing  bank the right  to defer  payment  on bank  notes,  so that  holders  would  get either  what  they were due
when  they  presented  the note,  or alternatively  that  sum  plus interest  in six  months. As Kroszner  notes,
these  options  were  quite  popular  until  banned,  largely  at the behest  of the large,  limited  liability  banks,  who
were losing  business,  as the options  made  small  banks notes  more  attractive.
7appear to be a potential solution to ensuring safe and sound banking. 7 Completely free
banking  -- including removing  monopoly  of note issuance -- need not be adopted  as part
of the same reforns, though as more countries are willing to consider currency board
arrangements, they might even consider this radical step. For now, a system of freely
competing currencies appears to be an idea whose time has not yet come.
Officials  intent on reforming  their financial  systems should keep in mind that most
banks -- and banking systems  --- encounter  solvency problems  (or bank crises) because
they  fail to diversify. To be sure, there are myriad reasons for such a failure, but these are
usually due to regulatory restrictions, an inability on the part of bank management to
plan, and connected lending. Regulatory restrictions are the easiest conceptually for
authorities to correct in principle. In the United States, the battle to keep as many powers
at the state level, coupled with a fear of concentrations  of wealth and political power, led
to the imposition of a prohibition on interstate branching, and in many states there were
further restrictions limiting banks to a single branch. Calomiris (1993) has shown that
branching states enjoyed more stable banks and lower losses per dollar of deposit than did
unit banking states. Michael Bordo in this volume shows quite convincingly how
branching restrictions led to a much larger failure rate in the U.S. than in Canada during
the 1870-1980  period. Canada experienced  the same shocks and was a smaller economy,
yet had a much lower bank failure rate due to nationwide branching, which led to far
fewer banks. Indeed, he notes that during the intemational business cycle contraction --
most severe in the 1  870s and 1  890s -- the contagion effect led to bank runs and a fuirther
contraction of output in the United States, but Canada, which was not spared the effects
of international forces, did not suffer further contractionary effects due to its better
insulated banking system. Having a small number of banks also facilitates the merger
process when one gets into trouble, as the remaining banks can clearly see the problems
7 The authors recognize that this suggestion may not be viewed as practical, given the trend in industrial
countries away from partnerships and unlimited liability. Still, the greater risks and volatility in developing
and emerging country markets may require different solutions than in the OECD economies.
8they might encounter if depositors at the insolvent bank suffer losses. Thus, with fewer
banks there may be a form of implicit  joint liability, and Calomiris (1992, 1993) has
substantiated these benefits in the case of U.S. clearinghouses,  for which the joint liability
feature was important.
It is likely that with the benefits of greater stability, there may be costs due to less
competition. However, Canadian authorities appear to have lessened these effects by
keeping their economy open. Hence, this case might be useful for small emerging
markets: for many countries the small size of their economies means that even with
branching, their banks will still be concentrated,  but then there is little choice, if stability
is desired, but to permit these banks to hold assets overseas (and to permit foreign banks
to enter the domestic market). Although many observers have noted that banks tend to
make losses if they stray far from their base, holding assets abroad need not mean lending
there. Instead, banks in small developing countries could hold securities -- such as shares
in internationally diversified mutual funds -- which would greatly limit their risk.8 For
example, Mexican banks were seriously weakened by the collapse of the peso in late
1994 and early 1995 and it is argued that the expected recession will be worse due to their
weak condition. If Mexican banks had held, say, 50% of their portfolio in the form of
internationally diversified mutual funds, they would be in much better condition today
and would be better able to lend and thereby support a recovery. Similarly, if Japanese
banks had done the same in the 1980s,  they would be in commensurately better shape at
present.
8 As should always be the case, attention should  be paid to asset-liability  management issues.  Thus banks
with mostly short term deposits would need to invest in money market mutual funds holding short term,
high quality treasury and commercial bills, while those with longer  term liabilities could hold some
medium and long term bond funds.
9As noted above, banks might be undiversified due to an inability to plan, such as
an unawareness of the risk covariance in their portfolio or simpleminded forecasting. 9
When asset prices or commodity prices rise, many banks have stumbled or failed because
they assumed that the price rises would continue, and therefore augmented  their
concentration in that part of their portfolio. Or, less knowingly, they failed to understand
the extent to which various parts of their loan book -- oil, land, and construction in the
case of Texas banks -- were correlated. This inability to plan might be understood more
as a consequence of poor incentives. If bank owners will reap a large reward from
prudent bank practices, then that is the activity in which they will tend to engage. Thus
Caprio and Summers (1994) argue that as banks franchise value declines, owners will
invest less effort in ensuring safety and soundness, and Keeley (1990) linked the
declining franchise value of U.S. banks to lower capital ratios.  Again, then, there
appears to be a case for making sure that banking is profitable, and in emerging markets
this usually means reducing the often excessive reliance on financial intermediaries as a
source of tax revenue, as well perhaps as imitating the Canadian experience.
Insufficient diversification might also be due to connected lending, in which
banks lend to related businesses  -- those that they own, or are owned by -- or to
businesses owned by friends, family, or by those willing to pay a bribe for a loan. Even
with proper regulations, history suggests  that banks demand alert supervision to prevent
these abuses, coupled with severe penalties in the case of transgressions. Regarding
ownership links, it should be noted that banks often arose in connection with nonfinancial
enterprises, such as in the case of Japan in the last third of the 19th century. However, as
Packer reminds us below, as soon as these banks acquired some size, they went from cost
centers to specialize on short-term trade finance and became highly profitable. They later
were split off from the commercial  firms and -- presumably because prudent banking was
sufficiently  profitable -- functioned as independent  banks, some of which failed in the
9 One could also classify interest and exchange rate mismatches as due to an inability to plan. De Juan
(1987) describes this process by which bankers descend along the path from being good bankers to bad in
greater detail.
101  920s but others remained quite successful. The Japanese also adopted a "hard
bankruptcy" policy that suspended transactions of firms that were unable to pay their
notes.  Tllus clear incentives matter. Also, when banks control firms -- as in Japan later
in time and in Germany -- excessive lending to related firms appears to be less of a
problem than when firms control the banks, as in the case of Chile during the 1970s and
early 1980s  lO.
Should ownership links be severed, and should banks be constrained to
commercial banking narrowly defined, or is universal banking the superior model?
Research has not been able to answer this thorny, long-standing  debate.  Kennedy (1987)
argues that in response to banking crises of the mid-nineteenth  century, U.K. banks
retreated to develop the most efficient short term markets in the world but cut back on
lending to industrial firms, whereas German  universal banks continued this lending in
part due to superior information  and control over corporate clients, related to the banks
ability to buy and underwrite securities including equity. Calomiris in this volume also
shows convincingly  that the German system permitted cheaper issuance of new shares
than in the United States. This is an important comparison: Sylla argues below that
inefficient regulation of U.S. banks -- in particular the balkanization  of this industry due
to limits on branching -- contributed directly to the development of U.S. securities
markets, which he argues were deeper than those in the U.K. except for the period 1937-
50.  Yet the fact that equity issuance was cheaper in Germany gave firms in that economy
an ability to expand quickly and to benefit from economies of scale, making the universal
banking model attractive for newly industrializing countries.
The major drawbacks to universal banking are first, that these institutions are
more complex to supervise than narrow commercial  banks, and second that they permit
more transactions to take place outside of open markets. The first concern is genuine, but
[0 See de la Cuadra and Valdes-Prieto  (1992) on the role of conglomerate groups in the Chilean crisis.
11goes to the issue of how much reliance is placed on supervision vs. incentives in trying to
assure safe and souiid banking. If greater primacy is placed on incentives, then the
supervisory concern might be lessened. Moreover, the efficiency gains noted by
Calomiris might be sufficient to outweigh these concerns. However, the second objection
is more one of culture and institutions. Some societies -- often when they are relatively
homogeYnous,  or are dominated by a relatively homogenous group -- are less concerned
about the potential for a build up of wealth and influence. Others, being less
homogenous, are more concerned about level playing fields and avoiding undue
concentrations of power. Thus these "tastes" might figure prominently in determining
whether or not to adopt the universal banking route. The evidence here suggests that, if
this model can be accommodated to other institutions in a country, there are some
potential efficiency gains.  Lastly, for developing and transitional economies in which
volatility is large, allowing banks some equity ownership may contribute to faster growth,
since if banks can only engage in debt finance in a high risk environment,  they may
retreat and do less lending than otherwise. An equity stake in their clients can (but does
not necessarily) make them inside investors, with the hope that better information will
offset higher volatility.  11
To summarize,  then, banking systems can be made more safe and sound by
focusing on incentives facing bank owners as well as by ensuring that banks are
adequately diversified. History has had some useful lessons on both counts. More
radical reforms, such as free banking and higher liability limits, may be viewed as
impractical in many countries, though as experience with systemic banking problems
spreads and grows in importance, as it has in the 1  980s and 1  990s in industrial and
developing economies, officials may become more disposed to return to these
experiments from the past. The reform that appears somewhat  more practical is to ensure
I I Gerrnan banks own relatively little equity but have influence by being able to exercise the proxy for
many shareholders for whom they (the banks)  were the underwriter.
12the ability of banks to diversify, and even to force this process in countries that are
relatively small. Although diversification, especially when it entails sending resources
abroad, can be perceived as reducing the supply of funds for local investment, the
improvement in the viability of domestic financial institutions may increase the volume
of savings intermediated by the formal financial system and reduce the fiscal cost of
covering losses associated with bank insolvency.
Even though incentives are important for motivating banlk  owners and managers,
banking licenses will naturally be attractive to a variety of unsavory elements, as well as
to investors who will attempt to maximize short run profits notwithstanding increased
risk.  For this reason, improving supervision in most emerging market economies is
important, especially where the existing system is geared more to a repressed regime and
not a market-oriented  one.  Supervisory  powers could be augmented  by either imposing
or vesting them with the ability to impose limits on bank growth, as rapidly expanding
lending routinely precedes bank failure.  Indeed, one could envisage a range of choices
for banks: highly capitalized banks could be allowed more powers and faster growth,
while banks with lower capital ratios could be constrained to slower growth and more
conservative investmentsI  2. Authorities in very risky economies could opt for 100%
reserve banking -- the so-called narrow banking model which represents the ultimate in
portfolio limits -- though it may take several significant banking crises before authorities
are willing to opt for this solution.
Financial systems can be made more stable also by developing savings and
nonbank financial intermediaries,  and it is now to the lessons from the history of these
institutions that we turn.
II.  Savings and Nonbank Finance
12  See  Vittas  (1992)  for a discussion  of growth  and  portfolio  limits  on banks.
13Financial policy in developing countries, and in most developed countries until
recently, has long been concerned with real or perceived gaps in national financial
systems. An early and persistent manifestation of this concern related to the shortage of
term finance and long-term financial markets that characterized most developing
countries. Commercial banks were widely criticized for focusing on trade and working
capital finance and neglecting the long-term needs of large industrial firms. In many
countries, commercial  banks were nationalized in an attempt to control their lending
decisions, while development banks were created  to channel (long-term) finance to
industry.
Development  banking and state ownership were institutional innovations of the
twentieth century. With few exceptions, their performance  was dismal as lending
decisions were often based on political considerations  rather than on economic criteria,
loan supervision and recovery were very weak, and they also suffered from high levels of
overstaffing and large overheads  13. Moreover, their main customers were often
themselves state-owned enterprises, suffering from overmanning, high labor costs, and
large losses. State-owned commercial  and development  banks were faced with the wrong
incentives and their failure to develop profitable  and efficient operations resulted in a
heavy tax burden on the rest of the financial system and the economy at large. In many
developing countries and especially in transitional economies, tackling the financial
problems of state-owned  enterprises and state-owned banks seems to be a sine qua non
for effective restructuring of each country's financial system.
Commercial banks were also widely criticized for neglecting the financial needs
of farmers, artisans and small traders as well as low and middle income people, especially
with regard to their needs for mortgage loans to finance the acquisition of houses.
13 World Bank (1989) contains  an extensive  discussion  of the failure  of state-owned  commercial  and
development banks in developing countries.
14Specialized thrift deposit institutions, ranging from various types of savings banks to
credit cooperatives  and credit unions to housing finance institutions were created, or
emerged spontaneously,  to fill these gaps in the financial system in the late eighteenth
and throughout the nineteenth centuries in many European countries as well as in the
United States and Canada.
The creation of thrift deposit institutions was often promoted by individuals of
substance and high integrity who were eager to transplant ideas and institutions that
appeared to work well from one country to another. Thrift deposit institutions took many
different forms. Some were state-owned,  e.g. the postal savings banks. Others, e.g the
savings banks in Germany, Switzerland and other European countries, were set up by
municipal authorities  and benefitted from their tutelage and guarantee. Most were set up
as mutual institutions, "owned" by their members but with limited liability. And some,
e.g. the rural credit cooperatives,  were established with unlimited liability among their
members, a feature that endured only in communities with a more equal distribution of
wealth. The types of thrift deposit institutions that prospered in different countries
reflected the structure of market gaps in the respective financial systems.
Thrift deposit institutions were stronger in countries where they developed a
three-tier structure that combined the local character and autonomy of individual entities
with the geographic diversification,  liquidity management, and auditing and control
services of central regional and national institutions.  In general, those that emerged
spontaneously by local interests performed better than those that were created by
government initiatives.
Thrift deposit institutions were an institutional innovation of the 18th and 19th
centuries. Their record was in general more favorable than that of state-owned
commercial  and development banks. They experienced considerable  growth in many
15countries and came to represent a substantial share, ranging from 20 to 40 percent, of
total financial assets by the mid-I 970s.
The success of thrift deposit institutions can be attributed to their generally low
transaction and information costs. Postal savings banks provided a convenient place for
saving for the poor. Credit cooperatives  and credit unions offered credit facilities to their
members that avoided the high spreads charged by money lenders. Housing finance
institutions developed long-term mortgage instruments  that facilitated the spread of home
ownership. Thrift deposit institutions relied on the simplicity and convenience of their
savings facilities for attracting funds from low and middle income households, while their
credit facilities benefitted from the local nature of their operations and from the peer
monitoring and pressure for loan repayment that were enco raged by the common links
among their members. Savings banks played a limited part in financing industry,
especially large-scale  manufacturing, except for the mutual savings banks in New
England, and the municipally-owned  savings banks in Germany  and other central
European countries. Their record was mixed. Early success was followed by failure as a
result of connected lending and excessive  risk exposure to cyclical industrial
downturns  1  4.
The financial fortunes of all types of thrift institutions were affected by the same
gyrations as those of commercial  banks. Like commercial  banks, they suffered when
they were faced with distorted incentives  (e.g. the Savings and Loan debacle of the 1  980s
in the United States) and they also had their share of fraud and mismanagement
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth  centuries. However, they were able to prosper in
14 In Germany, saving banks survived to the modern era, despite their interest rate mismatch and bouts of
hyperinflation, because they were supported by their municipal authorities.  Despite being state-owned,
they avoided a heavy politicization of their
operations.
16the longer run, supported by financial and political stability, and by efficient financial  and
legal infrastructures.
As argued by Vittas in this volume, the heyday of thrift deposit institutions  in
OECD countries was probably the mid-I 970s. Since tlen they have come under
increasing pressure from four main sources: changes in the size and distribution of
financial wealth that imply a growing demand for pension and mutual funds, which can
then meet the financial needs of housing and other markets through the use of securitized
instruments; greater competition from commercial banks, which have been forced  to re-
orient their operations toward retail financial services; changes in transaction and
infomiation technology that have undermined the past comparative advantage  of thrift
deposit institutions; and changes in financial regulation that have removed the barriers
between different types of financial institutions. These changes have motivated  the
recent trend of diversification  of financial services and despecialization  and the
concomitant trend of "demrutualization",  i.e. conversion of mutual institutions into  joint
stock ownership.
Thrift deposit institutions were also created in many developing countries,  but
their record suffered from the problems caused by high inflation, negative real rates of
interest, weak monitoring and enforcement  mechanisms, and government interference.
These factors helped to weaken and distort the incentives facing their managers, owners
and customers. Loan arrears undermined  their soundness and caused large  failures,
government bailouts, or stagnation. This sorry experience helps to underscore the
importance of financial stability and sound financial infrastructure.
Could thrift deposit institutions play a big role in the future in the financial
systems of developing countries? The recent changes in the technological  and
institutional environment  facing thrift deposit institutions in developed  countries  suggest
17that their prospects and future role in developing and transitional countries would be
rather limited. In particular, their role in financing large scale industry and in providing a
specialized circuit for housing finance would likely be circumscribed by the development
of more efficient networks based on securities markets and institutional investors.
Nevertheless, they could still play a role in rural and retail finance, as they did in
the nineteenth and early twentieth century in industrial economies. Thus, provided
inflation is kept under control, postal savings banks could mobilize deposits from poorer
areas where there may be few commercial  bank branches. Credit unions and credit
cooperatives  could encourage thrift among poorer households and among farmers,
artisans and small traders and they could distribute credits to these groups in countries
where commercial banks have small branch networks and are unlikely to be successful in
accessing these markets. But an important lesson from the experience of developed
countries is the creation of three-tiered structures, consisting of local, regional and
national institutions: local units operating in a small geographic area and having small
membership (and thus able to monitor the performance of local borrowers and exert peer
pressure for loan repayment), regional units providing liquidity, auditing and monitoring
services to the local units and national entities linking these institutions with the money
and capital markets and also representing their interests at the national level.
Low inflation and sound public finances are also an essential precondition for the
development of securities markets. As explained by Sylla in this volume, the securities
markets in the United States prospered after the restoration of sound public finances in
the aftermath of the American revolution.  A major funding and restructuring of US
government debt, which also included the generation  of secure state revenues to service
this debt, caused a very large increase in its market value within the spate of a few years.
The sound public finances attracted foreign capital and established the foundations for a
thriving government bond market. Other securities markets followed and they were
helped by the absence of restrictive regulations on the formation of corporations.
18A second essential precondition for the growth of securities markets is the
generation and dissemination of standardized  information. The development of
American securities markets lagged behind those of Britain between 1870 and 1920.
Sylla attributes this to the earlier development  of stock market regulation in Britain,
requiring corporations  to issue prospectuses and publish audited reports. During this
period, American securities markets suffered from a scarcity of reliable public
information and from endemic insider trading. However, during the 1  930s and 1  940s, the
market regulation developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
mandated disclosure of standardized  inforrnation  surpassed the financial regulation
imposed in Britain and contributed  to the further development  of American stock and
bond markets.
Many developing countries try to develop their securities markets by providing
tax incentives to firms to list on the stock markets, by offering tax incentives to savers to
invest in long-term instruments, or by requiring banks and other financial institutions to
invest in government and mortgage bonds. The experience of the United States (and
other developed countries) suggests that these measures may not be necessary. Once
governments set their public finances in order, establish effective regulation for
information disclosure and remove tax and other obstacles to the development of markets,
all they have to do is get out of the way and let the markets develop on their own.
But a major problem facing developing countries today is that it is much more
difficult to set public finances in order as governments  are more heavily involved in all
types of expenditure  programs and have large amounts  of explicit and implicit liabilities
that may not be as easy to restructure and downsize as was perhaps the case in the United
States at the end of the eighteenth century. As already noted, governments in developing
and transitional countries must tackle the problems of state-owned  enterprises, including
19state-owned  banks and insurance companies,  and must restructure their tax systems and
improve  the administrative efficiency of tax collection. But they must also reformn  their
social security  systems, which evolved over many years of government involvement in
the provision  of social pensions and are placing a heavy burden on public finances.
Restructuring  pension systems by downsizing the public pensions paid by social security
institutions  and encouraging the development of private pension funds is likely to be a
major  financial  and political challenge, but it could have significant  beneficial long-termn
effects on public finances and on the structure of capital markets  15.
Pension funds as financial intermediaries  were not important in the nineteenth
century  because coverage was limited and few people lived for any significant time after
retirement.  Historically,  pension funds initially emerged as labor market institutions,
essentially  as personnel management tools, at the turn of the century as large corporations
needed  to attract skilled workers, reward loyalty and facilitate the retirement of older
workers. As discussed by Williamson in this volume, pension schemes in the United
States  grew to replace more traditional forms of life saving, especially "tontine"
insurance,  which was banned in 1906. Early pension schemes were non-contributory and
unfunded,  and offered no vesting and portability rights. Their actuarial cost was low
because  the labor force was young and firms expected to provide pensions to a small
minority  of loyal workers who stayed with the same firm until they reached the
mandatory  retirement age 16.
Over time the structure of pension funds experienced  several changes. Some
pension funds became contributory and this increased pressures for better vesting and
portability  rights. There was a also a growing need for funding by investing in
15 The  feasibility  of pension reform and its beneficial effects for the capital markets has been demonstrated
by Chile, which implemented such a reform in 1981.  See Diamond and Valdes-Prieto (1994) and Vittas
and Iglesias  (1992) on the early  success of the Chilean pension reform.
16  This  pattern of development  was also experienced in Britain (Hannah 1986).
20marketable securities, a trend that was encouraged by tax incentives, and by fiduciary
standards.  Coverage expanded over time, although it has never reached a universal level,
as small employers have refrained from introducing pension schemes and the basic
retirement needs of low income workers have been met by the development of social
security pensions. A recent trend, that is fueled by basic changes in industrial structure
and employment pattems, is the relative growth of defined contribution funds, that are
based on individual capitalization  accounts and are fully funded, fully vested and fully
portable.
Pension funds are now a major force in the capital markets of many developed
countries as well as a small number of developing countries that have reforned their
social security systems (e.g. Chile) or avoided the creation of pay-as-you social schemes
(e.g. Singapore and Malaysia). Their role as financial intermediaries  has grown because
their coverage has expanded, life expectancy has increased, and funding has become more
widespread.  However, their role in the capital markets and in corporate governance is
still in its early stages of evolution. The progressive aging of the population of most
developed countries suggests a bigger role for pension funds as institutional investors in
the future.
Developing and transitional countries need to undertake a fundamental reform of
their social security systems, to lessen the fiscal burden of unsustainable and unfunded
liabilities, and to create the regulatory and financial conditions for the creation and
growth of supplementary funded schemes,  preferably based on full funding, vesting and
portability. There is some hope based on the Chilean experience  that a move in this
direction will also have a favorable effect on the level of savings, in addition to increasing
the supply of funds available for longer term investments.
21III.  Concluding Remarks
To recap, there are clearly some important lessons from the earlier history of financial
development, even though the environment within which financial institutions operate is
much different now.
The first lesson is the importance of macroeconomic  stability, implying low
inflation and sound public finances. This is important  not only for creating the right
incentives for banks but also for facilitating the development of securities markets. High
inflation and large fiscal deficits distort economic  behavior in favor of short-term
speculative projects and discouraae long-term investment  projects that are conducive to
sustainable economic development. Central bank independence  may contribute to
macroeconomic  stability. One way to increase central bank independence is by
lengthening the term of central bank governors.
The second lesson is to ensure that bank owners face incentives that induce them
to behave prudently. This implies that bank owvners  have capital that is commensurate
with the risks they assume. Although unlimited liability and double liability limits may
be less feasible now than in the past, the implication is clear: banks in developing
countries that face higher risks should maintain higher capital ratios than banks in the
more advanced OECD countries.  17
A third lesson relates to the need for risk diversification. Historical experience
shows clearly that banks face solvency  problems because they fail to diversify. Often,
17 Caprio and Summers  (1995) and Hellmann,  Murdoch, and Stiglitz (1994) argue that if capital  is scarce,
bankers incentives  can be improved by limiting entry and creating greater  charter value, in the form of
higher expected future profits.
22this failure is due to regulatory restrictions, especially geographic restrictions. But it may
also be caused by excessive connected lending or by genuine mistakes. Regulators must
ensure that banks diversify their risks. This requires removal of geographic and sectoral
restrictions, including removal of any prohibition to hold foreign assets. But it also
requires restrictions on connected lending.
Restrictions on connected lending as well as higher capital requirements imply an
important role for regulators and supervisors  to ensure meaningful and effective
compliance with such rules. Developing effective supervision is difficult and time
consuming but is essential if prudential rules are to be enforced.
The difficulty of supervising universal banks and financial conglomerates more
generally is an argument used against them in developing countries. But universal banks
may generate efficiency gains as they can overcome the problems caused by the absence
of reliable public information on industrial and comrnercial  companies. Holding small
equity stakes and being involved in corporate governance may produce beneficial effects.
The risk of excessive lending to related firms is likely to be small when banks hold small
stakes in industrial firms. In contrast, it is very high when firms control banks.
Effective supervision is also important for the development of securities markets.
Apart from low inflation and sound  public finances,  the other major factor that explains
the growth of securities markets seems to be timely and reliable public disclosure of
financial information and protection of small investors and minority shareholders.
Pension funds and other institutional investors have grown in importance in many
countries over the past thirty years or so, directly as a result of longer life spans and
longer retirement. Although these funds started as labor market institutions and
personnel management tools, they have become very important financial intermediaries.
23For developing countries, pension funds offer an alternative both for restructuring their
public finances and for promoting their capital markets.
Pension funds can in fact play the role that thrift deposit institutions, such as
savings banks, credit cooperatives and building societies played in developed countries in
the nineteenth century. But despite the changes that have taken place in the technological
and institutional environment,  thrift institutions can still make a positive contribution to
financial and economic development by promoting thrift and facilitating credit in rural
areas and among low income groups. Their contribution  will be stronger if they involve a
three-tier structure that combines the benefits of local involvement and monitoring with
centralized auditing and supervision.
Financial reformers in developing and transitional economies can also draw
lessons from the recent experience of financial systems, especially the adverse effects of
the heavy politicization of the financial system that has characterized many countries in
recent decades. State-ownership  of banks and other financial institutions is an extreme
form of politicization. This has potentially seriously adverse effects when large sections
of industry are also under state ownership. In these circumstances, banks are pressured to
lend to unprofitable  and overbloated  state companies. Restructuring and privatization of
state-owned banks and industrial companies should therefore be a high priority in
reforming countries. But privatization  by itself is not sufficient, as suggested by the
Mexican crisis of 1994-95. Developing  effective and independent  regulators is necessary
to prevent private bankers from engaging in self-lending  and excessively risky ventures
and relying on government bailouts in the event of failure.
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